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1 Introduction
Inflation targeting (IT) regimes are generally associated with higher macroeconomic per-
formances compared to other monetary regimes.1 In an IT regime, the central bank is
attributed a clear mandate to pursue inflation stabilization as the primary objective of
monetary policy. To this aim, a target for inflation is explicitely announced to the public.
However, there is still a debate about whether a central bank should explicitely announce
a numerical point or band target for inflation to the public. This paper precisely aims at
contributing to this debate by experimentally investigating how point and band inflation
targets perform in terms of macroeconomic performances.
The debate related to band versus point IT focuses on the advantages and drawbacks
of each regime. The main argument in favor of the adoption of a band IT regime is that
the band can signal to the public that the central bank may fail to achieve its numerical
objective in a context of uncertainty. Several countries have adopted such a IT strategy
(New Zealand, Canada), providing letters of explanations and the Governors of central
banks can even be given penalties as soon as actual inflation deviates from the band
target.2 Mishkin and Westelius (2008) analyze the behavior of band IT in a Barro and
Gordon (1983) framework, in which time inconsistency is not the result of central bank’s
preferences, but of the government’s pressure. They find that the band IT regime better
overcomes time inconsistency. They also show that in an environment characterized by
uncertainty about economic fundamentals, the bandwidth is highly crucial to avoid too
large deviations of actual inflation from the band. The higher the uncertainty on inflation
expectations, the wider the band must be to avoid too large a deviation of inflation from
the target. This could explain in practice, why some emerging countries that experience
more uncertainty on inflation expectations, tend to choose a large band target. Other
arguments in favor of band rather than point IT are provided by Heenan et al. (2006) and
Hammond (2012). First, a band target more realistically indicates what the central bank
can expect to achieve regarding its inflation forecasts. Indeed, in an uncertain environment,
the central bank may not properly predict the economic fundamentals. Moreover, all
price indices used to measure inflation are subject to errors. Therefore, by targeting an
inflation point, the central bank could unnecessarily react to any noise in the measurement
of inflation. Second, a band target can be relatively simply implemented. By contrast,
the persistence of inflation, combined with uncertainty and the delay in the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy imply that the central bank should be excessively active if it
wants to continuously achieve a numerical target, which is not easy to implement. Third,
a band target provides more flexibility to the monetary authorities to smooth short-term
variations in output at the expense of a temporarily higher volatility of inflation.
However in some cases, the point target may be more effective than the band for
1See e.g. Fraga et al. (2003), Levin et al. (2004), Roger and Stone (2005), Lin and Ye (2009), and
Roger (2009).
2For instance, the Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand is subject to resignation as soon as
actual inflation deviates from the band target without convincing explanations.
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anchoring inflation expectations, particularly when the central bank does not commit to
reach the mid-point of the band. This is especially true for countries with large bands
target as emerging countries. Bernanke et al. (1999) argue that missing a band (which
may happen from time to time) may be understood by the public as a more serious policy
failure than missing a point (which happens continuously and inevitably). Moreover, when
a band is implemented, agents mainly focus on whether inflation is just inside or outside
the band, rather than on the magnitude of the deviations from the mid-point which may
lead to higher volatility of macroeconomic variables.3 Orphanides and Williams (2007)
analyze the impact of announcing an explicit numerical inflation target in a model in
which agents have imperfect knowledge about the structure of the economy and rely on
adaptive learning to continuously update their beliefs. They find that announcing an
explicit numerical target can help anchoring inflation expectations and hence, reducing
the costs associated with imperfect knowledge which can lead to higher macroeconomic
performance.
In practice, the majority of IT central banks and especially those which adopted IT
recently have opted for a point inflation target, including point targets with tolerance
bands (Hammond, 2012). Using a laboratory experiment with human subjects based on
the standard New Keynesian framework, this paper aims at re-evaluating the macroeco-
nomic performances (in terms of inflation, output gap, and interest rate stabilization and
volatility) of point versus band IT. Recurring to a laboratory experiment is complementary
to survey data analysis dealing with natural expectations, as it allows to directly compare
the band versus point regime in distinct treatments. Indeed, the controlled environment
offered by laboratory experiments enables the experimenter to observe how subjects form
inflation expectations and their impact on aggregate outcomes under different regimes.
To highlight the role of the announced numerical target, we consider a New Keynesian
Learning-to-Forecast Experiment (LtFE),4 in which we evaluate:
• The announcement of a band or point target
The central bank implements and announces a band inflation target, and depending
on the treatment, it additionally announces the targeted point. Hence, if there is
any difference in terms of macroeconomic outcomes, it will solely be due to the
announcement effect of the numerical point target.
• The relevance of shocks
To take into account the uncertainty issue mainly put forward to justify the adoption
3In the same vein, Meyer (2002) and Mishkin (2008) argue that a point target is more appropriate in
that it provides a more precise anchor for inflation expectations of agents, and a more specific target to be
achieved by monetary authorities. When a country chooses to target a band for inflation, the implications
in terms of costs when inflation deviates from the band will arise, and in the absence of any explicit
focal point within the band, questions arise about where the monetary authorities would like inflation to
be stabilized. When the movements of actual inflation within the band do not matter for the monetary
authorities, the latter become too flexible and this entails a high variability of inflation, which can be
detrimental. In addition, a band target can undermine the credibility of the central bank, once actual
inflation deviates from the band.
4See Hommes (2011) for an overview on LtFE.
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of the band target, we integrate in the analysis a difference in the strength of the
shocks affecting the economy. More precisely, we consider two different treatments
in this respect: in the first one, the variance of shocks is low, while in the second
one, it is high.
Overall, our results indicate that when the economy is characterized by a low level of
uncertainty (low variance of shocks), the average level of inflation as well as its volatility
are significantly lower in a band targeting regime, while the output gap and interest
rate levels and volatility are significantly lower in a point targeting regime with tolerance
bands. However, when the macroeconomic environment is highly uncertain (high variance
of shocks), choosing the suitable IT regime is irrelevant because both regimes lead to
comparable macroeconomic performances.
The present paper is part of a growing experimental macroeconomic literature. Be-
cause of its methodology, it relates to LtFE as Pfajfar and Zakelj (2013, 2014), and Assenza
et al. (2013). It also relates to macro-experiments focusing on the role of central bank
communication as Cornand and M’baye (2016), Kryvtsov and Petersen (2013), Arifovic
and Petersen (2015), and Mokhtarzadeh and Petersen (2016). More precisely, Cornand
and M’baye (2016) analyze the role of announcing the target (by comparing explicit IT
with target announcement and implicit IT without any announcement), depending on the
objectives of the central bank. They show that communicating the target is only useful
in terms of macroeconomic performances if the central bank both has an inflation and
an output gap objective as the main role of the target is to reduce uncertainty on these
objectives. In the present paper, we therefore focus on a central bank having these two ob-
jectives and characterize which kind of target (band or point) allows to achieve the highest
macroeconomic performances. Arifovic and Petersen (2015) study the role of communi-
cation for developed countries to escape liquidity traps. By contrast, by considering large
and frequent shocks, our focus is on emerging market economies.5 We share however the
same interest in the relevance of more or less explicit communication. Indeed, Arifovic
and Petersen show that explicit communication may worsen the anchoring of expectations
on inflation targets. Interpreting our band target as less explicit communication (than
the numerical point target), our findings go in the same direction as those of Arifovic and
Petersen in the sense that for relatively low shocks, both the average level and volatility of
inflation are lower in the band IT regime. In a recent paper, Mokhtarzadeh and Petersen
(2016) propose a LtFE to analyze different forms of central bank communication about
projections on expectations.They show that central bank communication on projections
of output gap and inflation stabilizes the economy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the New Keynesian
model underlying our experimental economy. Section 3 describes the methodology, the
design of our experiment, and the theoretical predictions. Section 4 focuses on the analysis
of experimental outcomes. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
5Indeed, as argued by Calvo and Mishkin (2003) and Fraga et al. (2003), emerging market economies
suffer from instability due to large and frequent external shocks.
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2 The model
The simplified New Keynesian underlying theoretical model of the economy that is used
to design our experiment is as follows. The model is based on three equations: (1) the IS
curve, (2) the New Keynesian Phillips curve, and (3) the interest rate rule of the central
bank:
yt = y¯
e
t+1 − α(it − p¯iet+1) + gt, (1)
pit = βp¯i
e
t+1 + λyt + ut, (2)
it = pi
T + φpi(pit − piT ) + φyyt, (3)
where yt and y¯
e
t+1 respectively represent the current and average expected output gap,
pit and p¯i
e
t+1 respectively represent the current and average expected inflation, it denotes
the short-term nominal interest rate, and piT states the numerical inflation target of the
central bank. The parameters α, β, λ, φpi and φy are positive, gt and ut respectively
represent white noise exogenous demand and supply shocks,6 and φpi and φy respectively
capture the central bank’s response to deviations of actual inflation from its target piT ,
and to deviations of current output from its potential level. We realistically assume that
the reaction function of the central bank respects the Taylor principle: in an IT regime,
the weight attributed to inflation stabilization is more important.
In the New Keynesian framework, agents have to forecast both inflation and the output
gap. However, following Cornand and M’baye (2016), we consider only inflation forecasts7
and make the assumption of naive expectations on the output gap, that is the expected
output gap is equal to the lagged output gap (y¯et+1 = yt−1). Although such an assump-
tion may reinforce inertial expectations, there is significant evidence pointing to naive
expectations.8
Substituting equation (3) into (1), delivers:
yt =
1
1 + αφy
yt−1 − αφpi
1 + αφy
pit +
α
1 + αφy
p¯iet+1 +
α(φpi − 1)
1 + αφy
piT +
1
1 + αφy
gt, (4)
pit = βp¯i
e
t+1 + λyt + ut, (5)
6As in Assenza et al. (2013), the fundamental shocks considered here are i.i.d. white noises. Instead,
Pfajfar and Zakelj (2013, 2014) assume an AR(1) noise process, which implies that potential fluctuations
in inflation are endogenously driven by agents’ expectations.
7In contrast to Kryvtsov and Petersen (2013) or Arifovic and Petersen (2015), we ask for inflation
expectations only (and not for output gap expectations). As that of Pfajfar and Zakelj (2013, 2014) and
Assenza et al. (2013), our set-up presents the drawback to be less exhaustive in this respect but has the
advantage to ask subjects for an easier task.
8Both survey papers (e.g. Pesaran and Weale (2006), Andolfatto et al. (2008), Lanne et al. (2009),
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015)) and the LtFE literature (e.g. Hommes et al. (2005), Assenza et al.
(2013), Pfajfar and Zakelj (2014), and Petersen (2014)) show that subjects’ inflation expectations fail to
be captured by rational expectations, but instead are well described by simple strategies, such as naive
expectations.
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which yields:
pit = A+
αλ+ β(1 + αφy)
1 + α(φy + λφpi)
p¯iet+1 +
λ
1 + α(φy + λφpi)
yt−1 + εt, (6)
where A = αλpi
T (φpi−1)
1+α(φy+λφpi)
is a constant, and εt =
λ
1+α(φy+λφpi)
gt +
1+αφy
1+α(φy+λφpi)
ut is the set of
exogenous shocks.
3 The experiment
Following the LtFE literature, the experiment consists in asking subjects for inflation
expectations, which are then put back into the model yielding economic outcomes.9 For
experimental purpose, we calibrate the model parameters as Clarida et al. (2000): β =
0.99, α = 1, and λ = 0.3, and as in Cornand and M’baye (2016) we set the central bank’s
target value at piT = 5. This section presents the methodology, the procedure of our
experiment, and provides a theoretical benchmark.
3.1 Methodology
As already explained, the experiment consists in asking subjects for their inflation expec-
tations in the lab, and introducing them into the model presented in Section 2, which
allows to compute, period after period, the values of the main macroeconomic variables
(inflation, output gap, and interest rate).
Our main objective is to evaluate the macroeconomic performances of point versus
band IT according to the strength of the shocks affecting the economy. We thus consider
four different treatments in which subjects’ task is to forecast next period inflation at each
of the 60 periods of a session:
• Treatment 1 - Band targeting with small shocks: the central bank simply an-
nounces a band inflation target (which consists in the interval [4% − 6%]) to the
public, in a context where shocks have a variance of 0.08.
• Treatment 2 - Point targeting with small shocks: the central bank explicitly com-
municates its 5% numerical target with a tolerance band of +/-1% around its target
in a context where the variance of shocks is 0.08 (same variance as in Treatment 1).
• Treatment 3 - Band targeting with large shocks: the central bank simply announces
the band inflation target ([4% − 6%]) to the public (as in Treatment 1), but in a
9Our experimental framework is close to Pfajfar and Zakelj (2013, 2014) and Assenza et al. (2013),
as we use the same model and the results come from agents’ inflation expectations. However, our study
differs from theirs in at least two respects. First, while these papers focus on the interplay between
agents’ inflation expectations formation process and monetary policy, our analysis focuses more precisely
on the role of the announced point and band inflation target on agents’ inflation expectations and on
macroeconomic outcomes. Second, the reaction function of the central bank is also different: Pfajfar and
Zakelj (2013, 2014) and Assenza et al. (2013) assume that the central bank only cares about inflation
stabilization, while we more realistically assume that the central bank additionally takes into account (but
with less weight) output gap stabilization.
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context where the variance of shocks is 0.5.
• Treatment 4 - Point targeting with large shocks: the central bank explicitly com-
municates its 5% numerical target with a tolerance band of +/-1% around its target
(as in Treatment 2), but in a context where the variance of shocks is 0.5 (same
variance as in Treatment 3).
Four sessions with 6 subjects each were conducted for each treatment, yielding 4 inde-
pendent observations per treatment, as stated in Table 1.
Treatment φpi φy Nb. of sessions (obs.) Variance of shocks Announcement
1 1.5 0.5 4 0.08 band [4%− 6%]
2 1.5 0.5 4 0.08 band [4%− 6%] and point 5%
3 1.5 0.5 4 0.5 band [4%− 6%]
4 1.5 0.5 4 0.5 band [4%− 6%] and point 5%
Table 1: Summary of sessions
3.2 Procedure
The experiment was run at the GATE-LSE laboratory (University of Lyon). Most subjects
were undergraduate students from engineering and business administration. Participants
earned about e15 on average depending on the accuracy of their forecasts. Sessions lasted
about 45 minutes.10
At the beginning of each session, subject were given written instructions11 describing
the economy, which was depicted by four main macroeconomic variables : inflation, output
gap, interest rate and the central bank’s point or band inflation target, and presenting to
participants their role as forecasters in the economy. Subjects were informed about the fact
that a point or band IT regime was implemented by the central bank in an environment
subject to shocks. In all treatments, the economy began with initial values for inflation,
output gap and interest rate of zero to ease treatment comparisons. While participants
were not informed about the true model underlying the economy, they could observe on
their screen time series of these variables up to the current period. They knew that the
actual values of inflation and output gap mainly depended on their own predictions, as
well as those of other subjects and that these macroeconomic outcomes depended on the
lagged output gap, on random shocks that affected the economy, and on the central bank’s
inflation target. For comparison purpose, the small shocks treatments (Treatments 1 and
2) on the one hand, and the large shocks treatments (Treatments 3 and 4) on the other
hand respectively implemented the same random shocks.
Participants’ payoff function was given by: max
{
160
1 + f
− 40, 0
}
, where f =| pit −
piit/t−1 | denoted the absolute value of the forecasting errors made by subject i, and was
10The program was written using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
11Appendix E provides a translation from French to English of instructions. Appendix F shows some
examples of the screens.
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expressed in percentage points. This payoff function is such that a subject i gets some
points whenever its forecasting error is below 3% and the smaller this forecasting error,
the higher the payoff.
3.3 Theoretical predictions
In a LtFE, subjects do not know the model of the economy but are only familiarized
with a qualitative description of how the economy works. Therefore, and as already
observed in many experiments, we do not expect subjects to form rational expectations.
To account for the role of communicating the point target, we thus provide a theoretical
benchmark based on a homogenous forecasting heuristics that includes the target and a
naive component.12 For simulations purpose, the specific form given to this forecasting
heuristic is: piit+2|t = qpi
T + (1 − q)pit−1, which is inspired from Bomfin and Rudebusch
(2000).
Figure 1 presents simulations results for output gap, inflation, and interest rates, set-
ting (as in the experiment) initial values to zero for both strength of shocks (small ones on
the left panels; large ones on the right panels). The solid line depicts the macroeconomic
outcome for a forecasting heuristic that accounts for the communication of the point target
(q = 1 in the simulations13), while the dashed line depicts the macroeconomic outcomes
for a forecasting heuristic that does not account for the communication of the point target
(q = 0 in the simulations).14
The comparison between the economic outcomes obtained with two different rules
shows that macroeconomic variables converge more quickly to steady state values when
the target is announced. This is especially true when the economy faces small shocks.
Appendix A provides descriptive statistics showing that average levels of macroeconomic
variables are much closer to steady state values15 and variances are much lower when the
target is announced. In particular, with an announced target, inflation and interest rate
are higher and the output gap is smaller than when the target is not announced.
So we conclude that in principle the announcement of the point target speads up
convergence, slightly affects average levels and reduces the variance of macroeconomic
outcomes, especially when the economy faces small shocks. In the case of large shocks,
the effects are much less pronounced and even ambiguous.
12This rule represents only one example. One could do the same exercise with a rule including the target
and adaptive or trend-extrapolative inflation expectations.
13Simulations with lower values of q yield very similar trends.
14The latter rule is extreme in the sense that it does not account for the announcement of the band
target. It therefore simply provides an idea on the direction of outcomes in comparison to a situation
where the point target is communicated.
15The steady state is y¯ = 0.1, p¯i = 4.8, i¯ = 4.8, which are close to target values.
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Figure 1: Inflation, output and interest rate with and without point target communication
for small (left panels) and large (right panels) shocks
4 Experimental economic outcomes
We now analyze the macroeconomic outcomes of our experimental economy.16 Figure 2
presents the evolution of average inflation and inflation expectations across treatments. A
graphical pairwise comparison shows that inflation and inflation expectations series exhibit
similar patterns in Treatments 1 and 2 on the one hand, and in Treatments 3 and 4 on
the other hand. Although both variables never go out of the inflation range of 4-6% from
16This section partly relies on individual expectation formation as described in Appendix G to explain
macroeconomic results.
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the 5th period on in all treatments, we observe convergence towards the numerical point
target when the economy is not subject to large shocks, and oscillations around the target
in a context of large shocks.
Figure 2: Average inflation and inflation expectations across treatments
In order to analyze whether explicitly announcing the numerical point target is rele-
vant in terms of macroeconomic performance according to the economic environment, we
perform a pairwise comparison between treatments, by using non-parametric statistical
tests.17 We present the case of band versus point IT in a context of small shocks first,
before analyzing the case of large shocks.
4.1 Band vs. point IT: the case of small shocks
Figure 3 depicts the evolution of average inflation and output gap series18 for band versus
point IT (over 4 independent sessions for each treatment) when the macroeconomic envi-
ronment is subject to small shocks. Inflation series exhibit quite similar trend-convergence
although there is a faster convergence towards the numerical point target in Treatment
17The Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon procedure is used to test for equality of medians between macroeconomic
series of treatments, while Siegel-Tukey’s test is used to assess whether there is a difference in terms of
variances between series. The null hypothesis is that there is equality between series of interest in terms
of medians or variances.
18Appendix D provides figures showing the evolution of inflation and average inflation expectations for
each session of each treatment.
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2 (Point - low variance of shocks). Output gap series also present similar trends. Ap-
pendix C shows statistical tests regarding comparisons in macroeconomic outcomes series
to capture differences between treatments.
Figure 3: Average inflation and output gap series for band versus point IT with low
variance of shocks
The statistical tests performed over 4 independent sessions for each treatment indicate
that the average level of inflation is significantly higher in a point targeting regime with
tolerance bands than in a band IT (4.78% and 4.65% respectively). This observation
can be explained by the faster and more important convergence towards the numerical
target of 5% in the former regime. The announcement of the mid-point is thus relevant
to insure faster convergence. However, the volatility of inflation is significantly lower in
a band targeting regime than in a point targeting with tolerance bands.19 Both findings
are consistent with theoretical predictions as developed in Section 3.3.
We find that the average level of output gap as well as its volatility are significantly
lower in a point targeting regime with tolerance bands than in a band targeting regime.
These results are also consistent with theoretical predictions as in Section 3.3.
Finally, concerning the interest rate, we find ambiguous results. Indeed, while its
average level is significantly lower in a band targeting regime (contrasting with theoretical
predictions), its volatility is on the contrary significantly lower in a point targeting regime
with tolerance bands (in line with theoretical predictions).
We can summarize our findings as follows.
Result 1. When the economy is affected by small shocks, the average level of inflation
as well as its volatility are significantly lower in a band targeting regime than in a point
targeting regime with tolerance bands. The announcement effect of the mid-point target is
however beneficial in terms of more rapid convergence towards the target. On the other
hand, the average level of the output gap as well as the volatility of the output gap and
interest rate are significantly lower in a point targeting regime with tolerance bands.
19See also Appendix B for the descriptive statistics of all treatments.
11
Our analysis implies that when the economy faces small shocks, choosing the appro-
priate IT regime depends on the preference of the monetary authorities. If the latter are
primarily interested in keeping inflation and its volatility low, then they should opt for a
band IT. If in addition to the inflation stabilization objective, they wish to have a lower
volatility of the output gap and interest rate, a point IT with a tolerance band seems
preferable. The economic and financial stability would be reached in this case at the cost
of temporarily higher inflation volatility.
Our findings stand in contrast to the literature. Indeed, according to Heenan et al.
(2006), and Meyer (2002), a band IT provides more flexibility to the monetary authorities
to smooth short-term variations in output at the expense of a temporarily higher volatility
of inflation. Instead, we find that this beneficial effect of flexibility is more important in
a point IT accompagnied by a tolerance band.
4.2 Band vs. point IT: the case of large shocks
Figure 4 presents the evolution of average inflation and output gap series for inflation band
versus point targeting when the macroeconomic environment is subject to large shocks.
Figure 4: Average inflation and output gap series for band versus point IT with high
variance of shocks
For both treatments, regarding both average inflation and output gap series, we ob-
serve similar trend-oscillations around the targets due to the higher variance of the shocks
affecting the economy. Again, we recurse to statistical tests presented in Appendix C to
check whether there are differences between both treatments in terms of macroeconomic
outcomes series. Tests indicate that there are no significant differences at all conventional
levels in terms of medians (or means) and variances of all macroeconomic outcomes be-
tween both regimes. These results are overall consistent with theoretical predictions as
developed in Section 3.3.
The main implications of our analysis is that when the macroeconomic environment is
subject to large shocks, the announcement of the numerical target does not make a differ-
ence. Two main reasons can be put forward to explain this result. The first explanation
12
can be found in the irrelevance of the credibility issue in this environment. Indeed, the
relatively weak control of the central bank over the macro-environment does not make
a difference in terms of macroeconomic outcomes compared to the band targeting case.
The second reason is related to the forecasting rules used by subjects. As explained in
Appendix G, the trend extrapolation rule (the upward (downward) movements in inflation
in the current period will be followed by the downward (upward) movements in the next
period) better explains the evolution of average inflation expectations in all treatments.
When the environment is subject to large shocks, the trend-extrapolating rule renders
stabilization more complicated. Hence, the role of the announced target in this context is
rather insignificant.
We can summarize our findings as follows.
Result 2. When the economic environment is subject to large shocks, the choice of the
appropriate inflation targeting regime is irrelevant because the macroeconomic performance
of both regimes is similar.
5 Conclusion
We analyze the rationale of adopting a band versus point IT, using laboratory experiments
with human subjects. We implement a standard New Keynesian model in the lab to
evaluate the macroeconomic performances of both IT regimes according to the strength
of the shocks affecting the economy.
Overall, our results highlight that the choice of the appropriate IT regime depends on
the macroeconomic environment, as well as on the preferences of the central bank. When
the macroeconomic environment is subject to small shocks, choosing the appropriate IT
regime depends on the preference of the monetary authorities. Indeed, if they are primarily
interested in keeping inflation and its volatility low, then they should opt for an inflation
band targeting. If, in addition to the inflation stabilization objective, they wish to have
a lower volatility of the output gap and interest rate, a point IT with a tolerance band
should be adopted. The economic and financial stability would be reached in this case
at the cost of temporarily higher inflation volatility. However, when the macroeconomic
environment is subject to large shocks, choosing the suitable IT regime is irrelevant because
both regimes lead to comparable macroeconomic performances. While the applicability of
experimental results outside the lab should be handled carefully, our study questions the
relevance of clarifying a numerical point target within the bands especially in emerging
market economies more inclined to large and frequent shocks.
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Appendix A: Theoretical predictions - Descriptive statistics
small shocks large shocks
Point IT No communication Point IT No communication
Inflation 4.80 4.31 4.89 4.62
Mean Output 0.11 0.40 0.11 0.28
Interest rate 4.80 4.22 4.93 4.60
Inflation 0.51 1.28 0.66 1.22
Variance Output 0.03 0.29 0.34 0.35
Interest rate 0.59 1.81 0.75 1.83
Appendix B: Experiment - Descriptive statistics
B.1. Band IT
Inflation expectations
Stat. by session (S) BT with low variance of shocks BT with high variance of shocks
S1 S2 S3 S4 Avg S1 S2 S3 S4 Avg
Mean 4.57 4.52 4.74 4.61 4.61 4.96 5.06 4.93 5.17 5.03
Median 4.60 4.58 4.77 4.65 4.66 4.96 5.05 4.97 5.24 5.06
SdtDev 0.12 0.17 0.21 0.16 0.15 0.42 0.26 0.21 0.33 0.25
Inflation
Stat. by session (S) BT with low variance of shocks BT with high variance of shocks
S1 S2 S3 S4 Avg S1 S2 S3 S4 Avg
Mean 4.58 4.54 4.72 4.62 4.62 4.96 5.06 4.94 5.15 5.03
Median 4.60 4.60 4.80 4.70 4.65 5 5.10 5 5.20 5.09
SdtDev 0.18 0.20 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.51 0.43 0.41 0.45 0.42
Output gap
Stat. by session (S) BT with low variance of shocks BT with high variance of shocks
S1 S2 S3 S4 Avg S1 S2 S3 S4 Avg
Mean 0.29 0.29 0.17 0.24 0.25 -0.03 -0.09 -0.01 -0.14 -0.07
Median 0.35 0.35 0.20 0.30 0.30 -0.05 -0.10 -0.05 -0.20 -0.13
SdtDev 0.29 0.30 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.52 0.47 0.48 0.51 0.49
Interest rate
Stat. by session (S) BT with low variance of shocks BT with high variance of shocks
S1 S2 S3 S4 Avg S1 S2 S3 S4 Avg
Mean 4.55 4.48 4.69 4.57 4.57 4.96 5.06 4.93 5.17 5.03
Median 4.60 4.60 4.80 4.70 4.65 5 5.20 5 5.30 5.14
SdtDev 0.38 0.41 0.44 0.42 0.40 0.74 0.67 0.63 0.66 0.63
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B.2. Point IT
Inflation expectations
Stat. by session (S) PT with low variance of shocks PT with high variance of shocks
S1 S2 S3 S4 Avg S1 S2 S3 S4 Avg
Mean 4.83 4.31 5.05 4.89 4.77 4.95 5.18 4.89 5.09 5.03
Median 4.84 4.52 5 4.92 4.81 5.03 5.16 4.93 5.09 5.07
SdtDev 0.16 0.43 0.23 0.17 0.14 0.28 0.51 0.24 0.24 0.25
Inflation
Stat. by session (S) PT with low variance of shocks PT with high variance of shocks
S1 S2 S3 S4 Avg S1 S2 S3 S4 Avg
Mean 4.80 4.37 4.99 4.85 4.75 4.97 5.16 4.91 5.08 5.03
Median 4.80 4.50 5 4.90 4.78 5 5.15 5 5.10 5.04
SdtDev 0.19 0.39 0.25 0.22 0.19 0.44 0.64 0.42 0.43 0.45
Output gap
Stat. by session (S) PT with low variance of shocks PT with high variance of shocks
S1 S2 S3 S4 Avg S1 S2 S3 S4 Avg
Mean 0.15 0.39 0.02 0.14 0.17 -0.03 -0.16 -0.01 -0.09 -0.07
Median 0.20 0.40 0.10 0.20 0.23 -0.10 -0.15 -0.05 -0.10 -0.10
SdtDev 0.29 0.35 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.49 0.56 0.50 0.47 0.49
Interest rate
Stat. by session (S) PT with low variance of shocks PT with high variance of shocks
S1 S2 S3 S4 Avg S1 S2 S3 S4 Avg
Mean 4.80 4.27 4.99 4.86 4.73 4.96 5.19 4.89 5.09 5.03
Median 4.90 4.50 5 4.95 4.83 5.10 5.25 5 5.20 5.16
SdtDev 0.39 0.59 0.44 0.43 0.39 0.68 0.92 0.65 0.67 0.68
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Appendix C: Statistical tests results
In the following tables, p-values are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * respectively
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% conventional levels.
C.1. Pairwise comparison: band versus point IT with low variance of
shocks
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test Siegel-Tukey test
Macroeconomic outcomes Statistical equality of medians? Statistical equality of variances?
Inflation No*** (0.0001) No*(0.0566)
Output gap No***(0.0010) No*(0.0879)
Interest rate No***(0.0001) No**(0.0118)
C.2. Pairwise comparison: band versus point IT with high variance of
shocks
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test Siegel-Tukey test
Macroeconomic outcomes Statistical equality of medians? Statistical equality of variances?
Inflation Yes (0.8583) Yes (0.6785)
Output gap Yes (0.9958) Yes (0.7709)
Interest rate Yes (0.8914) Yes (0.5868)
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Appendix D: Average inflation and inflation expectations se-
ries across sessions by treatment
Figure 5: Average inflation and inflation expectations under band IT with low variance of
shocks for 4 different sessions
Figure 6: Average inflation and inflation expectations under band IT with large variance
of shocks for 4 different sessions
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Figure 7: Average inflation and inflation expectations under point IT with low variance
of shocks for 4 different sessions
Figure 8: Average inflation and inflation expectations under point IT with large variance
of shocks for 4 different sessions
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Appendix E: Instructions
We present a translation from French to English of the instructions for inflation point tar-
geting treatments. Instructions for other treatments are available from the authors upon
request.
General information
Thank you for your participation to this economic experiment in which you can earn
money. Your earnings will depend on both your actions and those of the other participants
and will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment. From now until the end of the
experiment, you are not allowed to communicate with each other. If you have any question,
please raise your hand and we will come to you.
You are a group of 6 participants. The rules are the same for all participants. The
experiment consists of 60 periods. Your role is to predict future values of a given economic
variable. Your earnings will depend on the accuracy of your predictions. At each of the 60
periods, the economy will be characterized by the following variables: the inflation rate,
the output gap, the interest rate, and the inflation target of the central bank.
Information about economic variables
To better understand the economic variables that you will use to make your decisions, we
explain these variables as follows.
Inflation: is defined as the generalized rise in prices in the economy. Inflation will depend
in each period on agents’ average inflation forecasts in the economy (that is, both your
forecast and the forecasts of the 5 other participants), on the output gap, as well as on a
random shock affecting the economy.
The output gap: describes the gap between the current output and the potential out-
put (that is, the level of output the economy can achieve by using the maximum of its
productive capacity). If the output gap is positive, the economy is producing beyond its
potential level. Conversely, if the output gap is negative, the economy is producing below
its potential level. The output gap also depends in each period on the agents’ average
inflation forecasts (your prediction and the predictions of the 5 other participants), the
lagged output gap, the interest rate as well as a random shock affecting the economy.
The interest rate: is defined as the price of borrowing money for a period, and is set
by the central bank of the economy. The interest rate mainly depends on inflation (and
therefore indirectly on inflation forecasts), the output gap and the inflation target of the
central bank.
The inflation target: is clearly announced to all participants by the central bank in
the form of a numerical target of 5% with a tolerance interval of +/-1% around the tar-
get. The announcement of the inflation target reflects the central bank’s determination
to guide current inflation towards its numerical target. So the central bank commits to
reach its inflation target of 5%. However, given the various random shocks affecting the
economy, the central bank allows itself a margin error of +/-1% around its target. The
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inflation target then corresponds to a commitment of the central bank which has to ensure
(via the interest rate) that inflation in the economy will converge towards this target.
The central bank has two goals: one primary, and the other secondary.
The primary goal: the most important is for the central bank to stabilize inflation that
is, to make as quickly as possible actual inflation converge towards its numerical target of
5%. The central bank uses the interest rate to stabilize inflation. Positive and significant
deviations of actual inflation from the target (that is, actual inflation is not equal to the
numerical target of 5%, and is above the upper band of the tolerance interval of 6%), force
the central bank to increase the interest rate in order to lead actual inflation towards its
target. By contrast, when the central bank notes that inflation is too low compared to its
inflation target (that is, actual inflation is not equal to the numerical target of 5%, and is
below the lower band of the tolerance interval of 4%) and penalizes the economic activity,
it reduces the interest rate.
The secondary goal consists for the central bank in stabilizing the output gap that
is, the gap between the current and potential output of the economy, by also using the
interest rate. When the output gap is positive, the central bank tends to increase the
interest rate, and when it is negative, the central bank tends to reduce the interest rate.
All these variables can be relevant for your inflation forecasts, but it is up to you to
use them in your convenience to decide on your inflation expectations. The actual values
of the different variables largely depend on your inflation forecasts and those of the others,
but also on random shocks affecting the economy.
At the beginning of the experiment and before entering your inflation forecast for the
first period in the computer, you observe on the screen initial values of the main economic
variables (inflation, output gap and interest rate) at period 0. As stated earlier, the
central bank implements an inflation targeting strategy by announcing to all participants
its numerical target of 5% with tolerance interval of +/-1%. By this announcement, the
central bank commits to lead actual inflation towards its inflation target within a maximum
of two periods. So you observe the central bank’s target within its tolerance interval. This
target remains unchanged throughout the duration of the experiment. Based on these
variables, you have to forecast inflation for the next period.
Once you have made your decision, a period ends and a new period starts where you
observe the past and actual values of inflation, the output gap, the interest rate, and your
inflation forecast made in the previous period. However, you do not observe the expecta-
tions of other participants in your group (you just indirectly observe them through actual
inflation). All you observe in terms of expectations is your own time series forecasts. As
time goes on, you get a large number of observations that allows you to evaluate the accu-
racy of your forecasts compared to actual values of inflation, as well as the inflation target
of the central bank.
Information about your role in the economy
Throughout the 60 periods of the experiment, your role as an agent of the economy is
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simple. You have to forecast the actual value of future inflation. In other words, you
have to predict in each period, the inflation that will prevail in the next period based on
all information available to you when making your decision. You must then enter in the
computer your inflation forecast. Suppose that on your computer screen, you observe at
period 2, actual inflation. This observed inflation is not based on the forecasts that you
and the other participants of your group have made at period 2, but the predictions you
made in the previous period that is, those made in period 1 for period 2.
By choosing your inflation forecast, you seek to maximize your earnings. Your gain in
each period depends on the accuracy of your inflation forecast relative to actual (realized)
inflation. More specifically, your gain is given by:
Your profit in ECU = max
{
160
1 + f
− 40, 0
}
,
where f =| Inflation−Your forecast |. ’Inflation’ indicates actual inflation, ’Your forecast’
defines your inflation forecast made at previous period for the next, f indicates in absolute
value your forecasting error, and finally ’ECU’ indicates the Experimental Currency Unit.
The profit function above means that you get money every time your forecasting error is
less than 3%. The smaller your forecasting error, the higher your payoff. For instance
if f =0, you receive the maximum payoff of 120 units (160/(1+0)-40). If your forecasting
error is of 1.5%, you receive 24 units (160/(1+1.5)-40). Otherwise if your forecasting
error is of 3% or higher, then you receive 0 unit (160/ (1+3) - 40). You can only choose
your inflation forecasts within the interval [3, 16]. You can only choose whole numbers or
numbers with one decimal digit (for instance, 5, 8.5, 4.6, etc). In addition, when making
your decisions, you have to enter only numbers without the ”%” symbol.
Once you have entered your decision in the computer, click on the ’Submit’ button.
Once all participants have done the same, the period ends and the profit for this period is
written on the computer screen. Then, the next period starts. Once all the 60 periods are
completed, the experiment ends. At each of the 60 periods of the experiment, at the top
of each screen and on a graph, you can observe the entire history of economic variables as
well as your earnings. You can then check at each period if your inflation forecast made
in the previous period corresponds to actual inflation, and also whether it corresponds or
converges towards the inflation target of the central bank. You will get informed about
your gains period by period, and at the end of the experiment, your earnings will be added
and will be paid in cash converted at the exchange rate of e1=520 ECU. Note that you
do not get money in the first period of the experiment because you will not have made
any forecast for this period 1. So your potential gains start at period 2 of the experiment,
because you will have made forecasts at period 1 for this period 2.
Questionnaire
At the beginning of the experiment, we ask you to fill out a questionnaire to make sure
that you understand instructions. When all participants have correctly answered the ques-
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tionnaire, the experiment will begin. At the end of the experiment, we ask you to complete
a personal questionnaire on the computer. All requested information will remain strictly
confidential and is used for the sole purpose of research.
If you have any questions, please ask them now!
Thank you for your participation!
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Appendix F: Examples of screens
We provide examples of screens (first screen: band IT; second screen: point IT).
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Appendix G: Formation of individual inflation expectations
Agents’ expectations influence macroeconomic outcomes. Following the LtFE literature
that emphasizes expectation heterogeneity, we study the formation of individual inflation
expectations owing to the collected times series data for all subjects. This allows us to
evaluate the impact of point versus band IT regimes on subjects’ expectation formation
process.
Following Pfajfar and Zakelj (2013, 2014), Assenza et al. (2013), and Cornand and
M’baye (2016), we consider the main expectations formation models supported in the lit-
erature. We assume that subjects behave like econometricians and select both the given
rule and its parameters to forecast inflation. We do not include exogenous shocks in
the given expectation models, because they were not directly observable in the experi-
ment.20 For each subject of each session (each including 4 treatments), we estimate the
coefficient(s) of interest of the given expectation model (OLS estimation). Conditional on
the significance of the estimated parameter(s), we then compute for each treatment the
percentage of subjects using such and such forecasting rule.
G.1. Prediction models
Naive expectations model:
piit+1/t = α0 + α1pit−1, (M1)
where piit+1/t denotes subject i ’s (where i=1, 2, ..., 96) inflation expectation made at time
t for t+ 1, pit−1 represents the past period inflation rate, and α0 and α1 are the estimating
parameters.
AR(1) expectations model:
piit+1/t = β0 + β1pi
i
t/t−1, (M2)
where piit+1/t denotes subject i ’s inflation expectation made at time t for t + 1, pi
i
t/t−1
represents its past period forecast, and β0 and β1 are the estimating parameters.
Trend extrapolation model:
piit+1/t = γ0 + pit−1 + γ1(pit−1 − pit−2), (M3)
where γ0 and γ1 are the estimating parameters.
20We drop the first 10 periods of the experiment out of our regression samples. Indeed, as in Assenza
et al. (2013), we assume that subjects need to have first a learning step before completely forming their
forecasting rules.
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Adaptive expectations model:
piit+1/t = pi
i
t−1/t−2 + η(pit−1 − piit−1/t−2), (M4)
where η ≥ 0 is the constant gain parameter.
G.2. Econometric results
Table 2 presents for each treatment the percentage of subjects using the given expectations
model.
Model Band Point Band Point
low variance of shocks low variance of shocks high variance of shocks high variance of shocks
M1 87.50 66.67 75.00 79.17
M2 37.5 58.33 33.33 20.83
M3 70.83 87.5 87.5 70.83
M4 95.83 95.83 91.67 95.83
Table 2: Percentage of subjects using M1, M2, M3 and M4 expectation models for each
treatment
The relevance of subjects’ forecasting rule depends on the considered treatment. We
find that Treatment 1 (band targeting with small shocks) is the one which has the highest
proportion (87.5%) of subjects that use the naive expectations model (M1) to forecast
inflation, while Treatment 2 (point targeting with small shocks) is associated with the
lowest proportion (66.67%) of subjects that use this forecasting rule to form their expec-
tations. We also explore whether the behavior of individual inflation expectations among
treatments is consistent with the AR(1) model. We find that most subjects do not really
use this forecasting rule to predict inflation. Finally, we find that both trend extrapo-
lation (M3) and adaptive expectations (M4) prediction rules play an important role in
the dynamics of inflation expectations formation as all subjects in each treatment use
on average these models to forecast inflation. Treatments 2 and 3 are associated with
the highest proportion (87.5%) of subjects using M3, while Treatments 1, 2 and 4 are
associated with the highest proportion of subjects using adaptive learning rule to predict
inflation. These results are consistent with those of Assenza et al. (2013), Pfajfar and
Zakelj (2014), and Cornand and M’baye (2016) who find that subjects most use M3 and
M4 to form their expectations. Moreover, we find that for the trend extrapolation model,
the significant coefficient γ1 is below 0 for a large proportion of subjects in all treatments,
which suggests that on average and in all treatments, subjects using this rule expect that
the upward (downward) movements in inflation in the current period will be followed by
the downward (upward) movements in the next period.21
21Note that in Table 2, the shares of each treatment do not add up to 100%. This is explained by the
fact that subjects switch between different rules during the experiment as supported by the literature. See
e.g. Assenza et al. (2013), Pfajfar and Zakelj (2013, 2014), and Cornand and M’baye (2016).
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Let us finally look for the prediction model that best explains the formation of average
inflation expectations within each treatment. To do so, for each session of each treatment,
we consider average inflation expectations and look at all prediction models to select the
one that yields the highest adjusted R2. After doing so, we select the most relevant fore-
casting rule for a whole treatment. We find that the trend extrapolation rule appears to be
the forecasting model which best explains the formation of average inflation expectations
in all treatments.
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